

DFC XO 01



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IN REPLY REFER TO
1611
Ser N00/

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tr 1611 Ser (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 20 Aug 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS 834)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN

1. Forwarded, recommending approval of the Detachment for Cause (DFC) request.

3. I concur with the recommendations of the Commanding Officer and Commodore that CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) not be required to show cause for his retention in the Naval Service. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is not currently on a promotion list.

4. My point of contact in this matter is CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JAGC, USN, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
or email (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Conv to:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1611
Scr N00/352
25 Sep 19

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1611 Scr (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 20 Aug 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-483)

Via: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN

Ref: (a) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Forwarded, recommending approval of the Detachment for Cause (DFC) request.
2. Though he is referred to as LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) throughout this package, per reference (a), CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) promoted to the permanent grade of Commander on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).
3. I concur with the recommendations of the Commanding Officer and Commodore that CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be retained for continued service and remain eligible for promotion.
4. My point of contact for this matter is CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JAGC. USN. He may be reached at DSN (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or via e-mail at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

IN REPLY REFER TO
1611
Scr N00/284
9 Sep 19

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tr 1611 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 20 Aug 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-83)
Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Forwarded. I concur with the Commanding Officer's recommendation.
2. In May and June 2019, I spent more than a week embarked onboard (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at sea. I closely observed CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as the ship's Executive Officer. I observed a conscientious officer that was struggling with the complicated demands that comes with serving as an Executive Officer afloat. During that time at sea, I spoke at length with CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and clearly spelled out the expectations of an Executive Officer afloat and specifically addressed areas that he need to improve upon. Two months later I sent my Deputy, CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to embark (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at sea and observe CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) spent more than a week in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and he observed an officer struggling in his role, and incapable of meeting the demands of an Executive Officer afloat. These observations were consistent with the shortcomings clearly identified in the counseling and letters of instruction issued by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c).
3. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is a hard working officer that wants to succeed. However, the demands that come with being an Executive Officer afloat were beyond his capacity. The job was simply too big for him.
4. Although not capable of the demands that come with being an Executive Officer afloat, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has my strongest recommendation for continued service in the U.S. Navy. He cares and can play a valuable role serving the country as a staff officer or in another community.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1611
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

30 Aug 19

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1611 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 20 Aug 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-83)

Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(2)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Forwarded. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not desire to make a written statement.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to: LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

20 Aug 19

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tr 1611 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of 20 Aug 19

From: LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN, [REDACTED] 1110
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-83)
Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2) [REDACTED]
(3) [REDACTED]

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN,
[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. I have received the letter requesting my detachment for cause and I understand the request may be filed in my official record.
2. I am aware of the contents of MILPERSMAN 1070-020 and I (do/do not) desire to make a written statement.
3. I further understand that I have 10 calendar days from this date (until 30 August 2019) to submit a statement. If I make such election and then fail to submit a statement in that period of time, it will be treated as a waiver of that right. I understand that any statement I make must be couched in temperate language, be confined to the pertinent facts, and not impugn the motives of others or make countercharges.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
[REDACTED]



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1611

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

20 Aug 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-483)

Via: (1) LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(3)

(4)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1611-020
(b) OPNAVINST 3120.32D

Encl: (1) Letter of Instruction dated 4 Jun 19
(2) Letter of Instruction dated 15 Jul 19

1. Per reference (a), I request LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) /1110 be detached for cause from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) by reason of substandard performance of duty over an extended period of time.

2. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has been performing duties as the Executive Officer since (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2019.

3. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has not performed his duties as Executive Officer as required by reference (b). I assumed command on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2019, and during this ninety day assessment, which encompassed the fourth through sixth months of his tour, I have determined that LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) does not have the ability to effectively serve as (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Executive Officer. I identified several shortcomings and, in response, provided mentorship, training, and guidance. When those actions did not remedy his deficiencies, I issued formal, written counseling, with hope that he would demonstrate the ability to perform the duties of the Executive Officer. The following background is provided to summarize my efforts to provide training and assistance to LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) highlight examples of sustained substandard performance, and describe the supplemental measures which have been required to maintain effective and efficient shipboard operations for my command in a dynamic, forward deployed environment.

a. In (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2019, shortly after assuming command, I reviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) results from the previous month in preparation for the official inspection scheduled for August 2019. Multiple programs were assessed as ineffective, the majority of which were the responsibility of the Personnel Officer (PERSO). By that time, the PERSO had received two Letters of Instruction for failure perform her duties and the triad started to consider requesting the PERSO be detached for cause. However, despite knowing these circumstances, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) rescheduled the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to occur earlier, and when the

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JSN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

PERSO would be on previously-approved leave. As a result, the ship lacked sufficient oversight and was not prepared for the inspection. I issued LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a Letter of Instruction, enclosure (1), to highlight this deficiency.

b. Also in May, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received its (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) inspection. At the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) inspection out brief, the assessors expressed frustration at the ship's failure to correct the discrepancies previously identified at a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) review several months earlier. I then learned that LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received a list of those discrepancies in February, with a recommendation to make corrections and ensure (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) would be best postured for the inspection. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) took no action or oversight toward the identified discrepancies, and overall took little action prior to the inspection.

c. I discussed both of the above instances at length with LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). During our discussions, I highlighted the importance of the Executive Officer's role in providing oversight, guidance, and forceful backup to command leadership, at whatever level is required, to ensure successful execution of all evolutions. His response was that he simply "didn't know" and that he was committed to improving.

d. I shared my assessment of LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and summaries of our mentorship sessions, with CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) my immediate superior in command. CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) embarked (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for my first underway in command. In addition to the two inspection incidents, CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I discussed LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) apparent insecurity in his role as the Executive Officer, as observed over a six-day period of underway operations. At the conclusion of CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) visit, I told him that I believed that LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had the potential to settle into the job, and that I planned to provide mentorship and training. Additionally, I shared my plan to provide LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) additional assistance from the ship's force to provide him an opportunity to course correct and demonstrate that his ability to continue serving as (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Executive Officer.

e. To assist LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) I conducted a two hour mentorship session in which we discussed his first three months in the tour. I emphasized that he was focusing his energy and efforts incorrectly and that he needed to utilize our talented group of Officers and Chief Petty Officers to execute his guidance and direction. To aid in this discussion, we reviewed reference (b) and the duties and responsibilities of the Executive Officer and Department Heads, highlighting the differences, and discussed practical applications. I also provided him with lists of areas where the Executive Officer should focus, which would help inform his guidance to the Department Heads. Additionally, I assigned a first tour Division Officer, with two years onboard, as his administrative assistant to aid in the management of the ship's administrative requirements and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Plan of Action and Milestones execution. Finally, we discussed that my Operations Officer and Combat Systems Officer, the most senior and proven of my Department Heads, would provide additional backup and assistance to LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as required. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was receptive to the way ahead, seemed appreciative of the discussion and mentorship, and appeared satisfied with the supplemental measures to help him achieve success.

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JSN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

f. The command operated in this modified arrangement for two to three weeks. While there were some minor issues, it was no different than any other new Executive Officer who is settling into the job. On 15 June, I informed CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) responded well to the supplemental measures in place, and that he appeared to be improving and settling into the job. I stated my plan to slowly reduce and remove the measures in order to give LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) full charge of the Executive Officer position.

g. From 15 June to 1 July, I slowly returned Executive Officer responsibilities to LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). However, I quickly realized that LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was unable to stay organized, properly convey the command's priorities and tasking, and effectively manage the ship's routine, without direct involvement of me or the Operations and Combat Systems Officers. On multiple occasions, in addition to the morning triad meeting, I provided immediate feedback to LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that routine requirements were not being met. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) acknowledged this but I did not observe a response to rectify the situation. Within this two week period, each Department Head approached me independently and expressed a growing frustration with the unclear guidance and direction from the Executive Officer, who made everything a priority; they asked for clarification. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) failed to track and ensure completion of routine tasks, and he grew frustrated at his inability to stay on top of these items. Such tasks included: material discrepancy issues; execution of Division in the Spotlight; execution of the Zone Inspection Program; Afloat Self Assessment check sheet and warfare area reviews; home port shift planning efforts; scheduling and de-confliction of drills and operational tasking; legal matters; mid-term counseling; performance evaluation report processing; and other shipboard functions resident in the Executive Officer position for management, oversight and execution.

h. On 1 July, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told the Department Heads that they needed to "do their jobs" because he was "sick of getting punched in the face by the Commanding Officer," or words to that effect. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) told me of his comments at the morning triad meeting that day. When asked about his statement, he said that he was just frustrated and didn't really mean it. In response to his comments and his performance, I told LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that I assessed that supplemental measures, in the form of additional support by other Officers and Chiefs, were necessary to keep the command running effectively. I also issued a second Letter of Instruction, enclosure (2), which LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) acknowledged both verbally and in writing.

i. Since 1 July, I have observed a steady decline in LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) performance to the point that the additional assistance I put in place now completely absorb the majority of his responsibilities as Executive Officer. In addition to the areas already addressed above, I have counseled LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for his failure to participate in Damage Control Training Team planning and drill execution on multiple occasions; not effectively participating in the management of the ship's 3M program; and routinely delegating to the Supply Officer his responsibility to conduct mess and berthing inspections.

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

j. Additional assistance in completing Executive Officer responsibilities is being performed as described below. Accomplishing the additional workload impacts watch schedules and the amount of sleep received by others and myself.

(1) Commanding Officer. All routine administration, instruction reviews and updates, evaluations, internal investigations, SAPR, legal matters, officer sponsorship, ASA check sheet reviews and quarterly warfare assessments, Division in the Spotlight execution, Zone Inspection Discrepancy tracking, and mid-term and detaching evaluation debrief scheduling. Routinely provides the Executive Officer with prioritized lists and tasks for XO's call with the Department Heads. The content of these lists are limited to well-articulated requirements and priorities during daily triad meetings that are not being tracked or updated. Routine forceful backup to the Operations Officer for Plan of the Week/Plan of the Day reviews. To facilitate this workload I spend four dedicated hours each day between 0200 and 0600 to ensure that the ship is prepared to execute with clear direction and focus.

(2) Combat Systems Officer. As the Senior Watch Officer, and the third senior Surface Warfare Officer onboard, provides the command with priorities and guidance as the ship's operational requirements change at XO's call and Khaki Call. Primary backup to the Commanding Officer on the bridge or in CIC during all special evolutions or elevated conditions of readiness. Takes Commanding Officer reports and permissions to support off-ship conferences or to support fatigue management.

(3) Operations Officer. Runs and manages the ship's employment with limited input from the Executive Officer. Conducts daily schedule synchronization meetings with the Commanding Officer during the 0200-0600 timeframe to de-conflict internal command priorities and plans with operational tasking and requirements insuring that leadership begins each day with clear direction and guidance. The Operations Officer is purposely placed on the 0300-0600 watch to facilitate morning coordination meetings with the Commanding Officer.

(4) Executive Administrative Assistant. First tour division officer assigned to manage all manning and pay issues. Manages (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) corrective actions and milestones and conducts monthly reviews of all programs assessed as ineffective during the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) assessment referenced in enclosure (1). Manages all personnel transfers, temporary duty reporting/detaching date adjustments, and coordinates with the Supply and Operations Officers for transportation during any schedule changes that affect the steady flow of personnel to and from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(5) Navigator. Assigned to manage (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) preparation efforts. Chairs the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) a position originally assigned to the Executive Officer but re-assigned to the Navigator when no appreciable progress was made after four weeks. Coordinates with PERS and TYCOM with the assistance of the Command Master Chief to effectively prepare the command for the transition next spring.

(6) Command Master Chief. Supports all of the officers listed above to provide CMC level guidance and support in the execution of their additional duties traditionally shared

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JSN,
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

between the Executive Officer and CMC. Provides forceful backup to the Combat Systems Officer and Operations Officer in the execution of the priorities and guidance provided for command employment.

k. The functions listed above represent the preponderance of the Executive Officer's duties and responsibilities. In each instance, I advised LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that his management of these areas of responsibility was lacking and needed to be addressed. With no appreciable action taken, I assigned the aforementioned Officers with various duties to enable the command to continue to function. In each case, I advised LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of my actions and my reasoning for doing so. In each instance, he acknowledged the course-correcting action I took and did little to re-apply himself to the process and appeared to be satisfied with the adjustment.

l. The result of current shipboard management as described is an Executive Officer whose positional authority and contribution to the ship has been marginalized, with his knowledge, and with no corrective actions or response. Additionally, the Officers and Chief Petty Officers do not currently have an Executive Officer who can provide leadership and mentorship in the execution of their duties.

m. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has nine months of underway operations remaining prior to arriving in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). Six of those months are forward deployed operations and exercises. The measures put in place are not sustainable over an extended period, especially because four of my six Department Heads will transfer in the next four months. Additionally, I assess it as impractical to continue to adjust sleeping patterns, watch bills, and to assign Executive Officer responsibilities to my Officers and Chief Petty Officers whose primary focus should be on warfighting readiness within their Departments and Divisions.

n. LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has maintained a positive presence in front of the Officers and crew throughout his tour and continues to do so. Despite his best efforts, he is unable to handle the duties of the Executive Officer.

4. Though I have deemed LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) performance as unsatisfactory, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) still possesses potential to continue to serve in the Navy and he maintains my recommendation for retention and promotion.

5. I have given a copy of this request to LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) on this date and have informed him that the request may be filed in his official record. He was also informed that he has a right to submit a written statement and has 10 days, until 30 August 2019, to do so.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)